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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Leroy S. Wilske appeals from the judgment and conviction entered upon 
the jury verdict finding him guilty of driving under the influence (Case No. 41821 ), 
and from the district court's order finding that he violated his probation in a 
previous driving under the influence case. (Case No. 41822). 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Wilske attended a DUI victim impact panel meeting as a condition of 
probation for a prior DUI conviction. (PSI, pp.2-5.) There, an Idaho State Police 
chaplain who was facilitating the meeting noticed a strong odor of alcohol coming 
from Wilske. (PSI, p.2.) Wilske admitted that he drove to the meeting after 
consuming alcohol. (PSI, pp.2, 12.) Wilske submitted to a breathalyzer test, 
which revealed a BAG of .116/.118. (PSI, p.2.) Because Wilske had two prior 
convictions for driving under the influence in the previous 10 years, the state 
charged him with felony driving under the influence. (R., pp.31-32.) Wilske pied 
guilty to that charge. (R., p.124.) The district court imposed a unified six-year 
sentence with three years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Wilske 
on probation for three years. (R., pp.134-138.) The Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed Wilske's conviction on appeal. State v. Wilske, 2012 Unpublished 
Opinion No. 333, Docket No. 38298 (Idaho App., January 24, 2010.) 
In March 2013, Kootenai County Deputy Sheriff Ryan Jacobson came 
across Wilske in the driver's seat of a vehicle parked on the side of a road in a 
rural area, with the vehicle's engine running. (Trial Tr., p.163, L.6 - p.165, L.6.) 
1 
Deputy Jacobson observed that Wilske had slurred speech, glassy and 
bloodshot eyes, smelled like alcohol, and was sluggish in responding to a 
command. (Trial Tr., p.167, Ls.11-21; p.168, Ls.8-23.) Wilske also had a can of 
beer between his legs. (Trial Tr., p.165, Ls.7-10.) Wilske told Deputy Jacobson 
that he had not drank any alcohol other than from the one can of beer in front of 
him, and that he had spilled this can upon Deputy Jacobson's approach to the 
vehicle. (Trial Tr., p.165, Ls.16-24; p.167, Ls.1-5.) Deputy Jacobson then 
administered standard field sobriety tests. (Trial Tr., p.174, L.15 - p.177, L.11.) 
Wilske failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus and walk-and-turn tests, and failed 
to complete the one-leg-stand test. (Id.) Deputy Jacobson arrested Wilske for 
driving under the influence. (Trial Tr., p.177, Ls.15-17.) 
Once under arrest, Wilske told Deputy Jacobson that, in addition to the 
can of beer in the car which he admitted to drinking from earlier, he also drank 
one beer earlier at a friend's house. (Trial Tr., p.177, L.21 - p.178, L.18.) Later, 
a breathalyzertest revealed a BAC of .125/.132. (Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.5-8.) Upon 
a search of Wilske's vehicle incident to the arrest, Deputy Jacobson recovered a 
plastic container containing marijuana, a tobacco grinder that smelled like 
marijuana, and a glass pipe containing burnt marijuana residue. (Trial Tr., p.189, 
L.18 - p.190, L.18.) 
The state charged Wilske with felony driving under the influence, 
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and misdemeanor possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.223-225.) The court consolidated the charges for trial. 
(R., pp.207-208.) The state also filed a report of probation violation, alleging that 
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Wilske violated his probation in the prior DUI case by committing the new crimes, 
by consuming and possessing alcohol, and by possessing controlled substances 
and drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.319-320.) 
Prior to trial, Wilske moved to sever the driving the influence charge from 
the misdemeanor drug charges. (R., pp.292-293.) The district court denied the 
motion, concluding that the three charges were based upon the same act or 
transaction, that there was no risk of the jury confusing or cumulating the 
evidence, and that misdemeanor marijuana possession and misdemeanor drug 
paraphernalia possession were not the types of charges that would prejudice a 
jury sufficient to necessitate a severing of the charges. (11/1/13 Tr., p.9, L.23 -
p.12, L.7.) 
At trial, Wilske testified that, prior to parking his vehicle on the side of the 
road, he had only drank one beer, at a friend's house. (Trial Tr., p.390, Ls.8-14.) 
Wilske also testified that he was parked on the side of the road for between thirty 
and forty-five minutes before Deputy Jacobson arrived. (Trial Tr., p.390, Ls.19-
24.) Contrary to the statements he made to Deputy Jacobson, Wilske testified 
that, during this time while he was parked, and while his vehicle's engine was still 
running, he consumed three additional beers, and had started on a fourth before 
the deputy arrived. (Trial Tr., p.391, L.22 - p.392, L.14; p.395, L.13 - p.396, L.2.) 
Wilske admitted that he lied to Deputy Jacobson about how much alcohol he had 
consumed. (Trial Tr., p.404, L.22 - p.405, L.4.) Wilske also testified that after 
Deputy Jacobson arrived on the scene, and after Wilske had shut off the 
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vehicle's engine, he finished consuming the fourth beer. (Trial Tr., p.392, L.15 -
p.394, L.10.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, Wilske made a motion which the district court 
characterized as a "motion for a partial directed verdict." (Trial Tr., p.406, L.4 -
p.411, L.5.) Wilske argued that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to 
support several of the alternative theories of guilt set forth by the state in the 
charging information, specifically: (1) that Wilske drove under the influence; and 
(2) that Wilske drove with a BAG of greater than 0.08. (Id.) Wilske also 
requested that the district court admonish the jury to disregard any evidence 
regarding Wilske's BAG, because this evidence was irrelevant with regard to 
what Wilske implicitly asserted was the only remaining alternative theory that was 
supported by the evidence - that Wilske was in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. (Id.) The district court denied the 
motion, concluding that the state presented sufficient evidence to support all of 
the alternative theories charged in the information, and that the jury was entitled 
to believe or not believe Wilske's testimony regarding how much alcohol he 
drank after he parked his car, and after he turned his car's engine off. (Trial Tr., 
p.409, L.15 - p.411, L.5.) 
The jury found Wilske guilty of all three charges. (R., p.334.) The district 
court imposed a unified six-year sentence with three years fixed for the felony 
DUI, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.385-387.) The court imposed lesser 
concurrent sentences for the two misdemeanor convictions. (R., pp.383-384.) 
The district court also found that Wilske violated his probation in the 2010 DUI 
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case in each of the various manners alleged by the state. (1/6/14 Tr., p.7, L.21 -
p.10, L.17.) The district court revoked Wilske's probation, executed the original 
sentence, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.380-382.) The court ordered the 
sentences in the two DUI cases to run concurrently. (Id.) 
Wilske timely appealed from both the judgment of conviction in the 2013 
DUI case, and from the district court's order finding that he violated his probation 
in the 2010 DUI case. (R., pp.376-379.) The Idaho Supreme Court consolidated 
these cases for appeal. (R., pp.393-394.) 
5 
ISSUES 
Wilske states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Wilske's 
motion to sever in the 2013 case? 
2. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wilske's "motion for a 
partial directed verdict" in the 2013 case? 
3. Did the district court err when it found that Mr. Wilske had violated 
his probation in the 2010 case? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Wilske failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to sever? 
2. Has Wilske failed to show that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion for a "partial directed verdict"? 
3. Has Wilske failed to show that the district court erred in finding that he 




Wilske Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In 
Denying His Motion To Sever 
A. Introduction 
Wilske contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his 
motion to sever the misdemeanor possession of marijuana and misdemeanor 
possession of drug paraphernalia charges from his felony DUI charge. (R., pp.8-
13.) Wilske's claim fails because a review of the record reveals that the district 
court applied appropriate legal standards and reasonably exercised its discretion 
in denying the motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[A]n abuse of discretion standard is applied when reviewing the denial of 
a motion to sever joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14; however, that rule presumes 
joinder was proper in the first place." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564, 165 P.3d 
273, 278 (2007). In determining whether the district court abused its discretion, 
this Court considers "(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as 
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific 
choices; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." State v. Ellington,_ Idaho_, 337 P.3d 639, 644 (2014) (quotations 
and citation omitted). 
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C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Denying Wilske's 
Motion To Sever 
Idaho Criminal Rule 14 governs motions to sever and provides, in relevant 
part: 
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses or of defendants in a complaint, indictment or 
information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order 
the state to elect between counts, grant separate trials of counts ... 
or provide whatever other relief justice requires. 
"When reviewing an order denying a severance motion, the inquiry on 
appeal is whether the defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair 
prejudice resulted from a joint trial." State v. Tankovich, 155 Idaho 221, 227, 307 
P.3d 1247, 1253 (Ct. App. 2013). Idaho appellate courts have identified three 
potential sources of prejudice: (a) the possibility that the jury may confuse and 
cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; 
(b) the potential that the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses; 
and (c) the possibility that the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one 
crime and then find him or her guilty of the other simply because of his or her 
criminal disposition, i.e. he or she is a bad person. State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 
903, 908, 55 P.3d 896, 901 (Ct. App. 2002). 
In this case, the district court properly recognized that the question of 
severance was a matter within its discretion. (11/1/13 Tr., p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.1.) 
The court then expressly considered two of the three factors referenced in 
Eguilior - the possibility that the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, 
and the possibility that the jury may conclude that Wilske was guilty of driving 
under the influence simply because he was he was guilty of misdemeanor 
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marijuana and drug paraphernalia possession. (11/1/13 Tr., p.9, L.23 - p.12, 
L.7.) After considering these factors, the district court denied Wilske's motion. 
(Id.) This exercise of discretion is supported by the record. 
First, the district court reasonably concluded that there was no probability 
that the jury would confuse or cumulate the evidence. As the court recognized 
(11/1/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.1-9), the charging information did not allege that Wilske 
actually used marijuana or any other controlled substance on the day he was 
charged with driving under the influence (R., pp.223-225). Further, the 
information alleged only that Wilske drove or was in actual control of his vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol, not of any controlled substance. (Id.) 
Therefore, the court concluded, there was no risk that the jury would apply 
evidence of misdemeanor marijuana and paraphernalia possession to its 
determination of whether Wilske was under the influence for the purpose of the 
DUI charge. (Id.) 
Second, the district court found that "under these particular circumstances 
and in our culture," the marijuana and paraphernalia charges would not "inflame 
the jury" or create the type of prejudice that "other joined charges might." 
(11/1/13 Tr., p.11, L.20 - p.12, p.4.) The district court was entitled to utilize its 
discretion and knowledge of the local community and jury pool, and to recognize 
the relatively less serious nature of the two misdemeanor drug charges, in order 
to make the particularized determination that there was no likelihood that the jury 
would decide that Wilske was guilty of driving under the influence simply because 
he possessed marijuana and marijuana paraphernalia. 
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In addition, as the district court recognized (11/1/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.10-14), 
the jury was expressly instructed to decide each count separately on the 
evidence and the law applied to each, uninfluenced by their decision as to any 
other count (R., p.346). Wilske's claim that he was prejudiced by the the joinder 
of the cases because the jury may have convicted him on both counts "simply 
because" he is a "bad person" necessarily depends on a presumption that the 
jury ignored this instruction, as well as the reasonable doubt instruction and the 
elements instructions. However, as the Court noted in Eguilior, the presumption 
is the opposite because the Court "presume[s] that the jury followed the district 
court's instructions." 137 Idaho at 909, 55 P.3d at 902. 
On appeal, Wilske primarily attempts to show prejudice by relying on an 
analysis under I.R.E. 404(b). (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-13.) Specifically, Wilske 
argues that severance was required in this case because the evidence of his guilt 
for the marijuana and paraphernalia charges would not have been admissible as 
I.R.E. 404(b) evidence in a separate trial for driving under the influence. (Id.) 
Wilske correctly notes that the Idaho Supreme Court stated, in State v. 
Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 868, 664 P.2d 772, 775 (1983), that courts have engaged in 
an I.R.E. 404(b) analysis when reviewing severance issues, as the Court did in 
Abel itself. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-12.) However, that such an analysis is 
"useful," &, and even dispositive in some cases, does not mean it is required. 
Indeed, there are severance cases where I.R.E. 404(b) is never mentioned and 
the Court has instead applied the above-stated standard that asks "whether the 
defendant has presented facts demonstrating that unfair prejudice resulted from 
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a joint trial." See, §h9.:., Tankovich, 155 Idaho at 227, 307 P.3d at 1253; Eguilior, 
137 Idaho at 908-909, 55 P.3d at 901-902. Moreover, since Abel, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has recognized that "whether evidence would have been 
admissible absent the joinder is only a factor in determining whether a proper 
joinder is prejudicial." Field, 144 Idaho at 565 n.2, 165 P.3d at 279 n.2. 
Therefore, the district court was not required to conduct an 1.R.E. 404(b) 
analysis, nor is such analysis dispositive to Wilske's claim. 
Because the district court correctly recognized the severance issue as 
discretionary, and exercised reason consistent with applicable legal standards, 
Wilske has failed to meet his burden of showing error in the denial of his motion 
to sever. 
II. 
Wilske Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His 
Motion For A "Partial Directed Verdict" 
A. Introduction 
Wilske contends that the district court erred when it denied his motion for 
a "partial directed verdict" at the conclusion of the trial. (Appellant's brief, pp.13-
18.) Essentially, Wilske contends that the district court erred in declining to 
modify the jury instructions to remove references to alternative charging theories, 
which, Wilske asserts, were not supported by the evidence. (Id.) Wilske's claim 
fails because, even assuming that the challenged alternative theories were not 
supported by substantial evidence, a district court's refusal to remove from the 
jury's consideration an alternative charging theory in such circumstances does 
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not provide an independent basis for reversing an otherwise valid conviction. 
In the alternative, Wilske's claim fails because a review of the evidence, 
construed in favor of upholding the verdict, reveals that the state presented 
sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have found Wilske guilty of 
driving under the influence under any of the alternative theories set forth by state. 
Finally, even if the district court erred, any such error is harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction if there is 
substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 131 
Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 
570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 
1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review the appellate court will not 
substitute its view for that of the finder of fact as to the credibility of witnesses, 
the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Knutson, 
121 Idaho 101,822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991); Hart, 112 Idaho at 761,735 P.2d at 
1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are 
construed in favor of upholding the verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 
607; Hart, 112 Idaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072. In determining whether sufficient 
evidence was presented to support the conviction, the Court reviews the 
evidence that was actually presented to the jury, without regard to its ultimate 
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admissibility. State v. Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (Ct. App. 
2010). 
C. The Court's Refusal To Modify The Jury Instruction Does Not Constitute 
An Independent Basis For Reversal Of Wilske's Conviction 
Idaho Code § 18-8004( a)( 1), the state's DU I statute, provides: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of 
alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has 
an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined in subsection (4) of this 
section, or more, as shown by analysis of his blood, urine, or 
breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon 
public or private property open to the public. 
The statute further defines "actual physical control": 
"Actual physical control" as used in this section, shall be defined as 
being in the driver's position of the motor vehicle with the motor 
running or with the motor vehicle moving. 
I.C. § 18-8004(5). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted the foregoing language "as 
establishing one crime with two ways of proving a violation." State v. Robinett, 
141 Idaho 110, 112, 106 P.3d 436,438 (2005) (citations omitted). "[T]he first way 
to prove a violation is to show under the totality of the evidence that the 
defendant was driving under the influence." kL. "The second way to prove a 
violation is to establish the defendant drove with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 
percent or more." kL. The second method is commonly referred to as the per se 
theory. See, ~. State v. Juarez, 155 Idaho 449, 452, 313 P.3d 777, 780 (Ct. 
App. 2013) ("In regard to a per se violation under section 18-8004(1 )(a), the 
criminal act is having an 'alcohol concentration of 0.08 ... or more, as shown by 
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analysis of his blood, urine, or breath."'). "The State may elect to proceed 
against the defendant under either or both theories of proof." Robinett, 141 
Idaho at 112, 106 P.3d at 438. Further, pursuant to the statutory language, 
"driving" and being in "actual physical control" of a motor vehicle are also 
alternative "circumstances" under which the crime of driving under the influence 
may be charged. See State v. Cheney, 116 Idaho 917, 919, 782 P.2d 40, 42 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
In this case, the state charged Wilske with driving under the influence on 
several of the available statutory alternatives: (1) that Wilske drove while he was 
under the influence of alcohol; (2) that Wilske drove while he had a BAC of .08 or 
above; and (3) that Wilske was in actual physical control of a vehicle while he 
was under the influence of alcohol. 1 (R., pp.224.) The jury was instructed as to 
each of these alternatives. (R., pp.347-350.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, Wilske asked the district court to "strike" from 
the state's information the alternative charging theories alleging that Wilske 
actually drove, either while under the influence of alcohol, or while he had a BAC 
of .08 or above. (Trial Tr., p.406, L.4 - p.407, L.13.) Essentially, Wilske 
requested the district court to modify the jury instructions to remove references to 
these alternative charged theories. Wilske further requested that the "jury be 
admonished to disregard any evidence presented regarding the [BAC] of 
[Wilske]," because this evidence was irrelevant with regard to what Wilske 
1 The state's charging information did not include the fourth possible alternative 
charging theory - that Wilske was in actual physical control of a vehicle under the 
per se DUI charging theory, i.e, while he had a BAC of .08 or above. (R., p.224.) 
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asserted was the only remaining alternative theory that was supported by the 
evidence - that Wilske was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol. (Trial Tr., p.406, L.4 - p.407, L.19.) The district court 
characterized the request as a motion for a "partial directed verdict," and denied 
it on the ground that the state presented sufficient evidence to support all of the 
alternative charging theories it set forth. (Trial Tr., p.409, L.15 - p.411, L.5.) 
Wilske cannot show he was entitled to a modification of the jury instructions 
where, as he implicitly conceded, at least one of the alternative charging theories 
was supported by the evidence.2 Wilske can therefore not show that the district 
court erred by denying his motion 
It is well-established that a general jury verdict is valid so long as it is 
legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds. See Griffin v. United States, 
502 U.S. 46, 49 (1991); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1991); State v. 
Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 455-456, 849 P.2d 125, 128-129 (Ct. App. 1993). In 
Griffin, the United States Supreme Court recognized that while it would "generally 
be preferable" to give an instruction which removed from the jury's consideration 
an alternative basis of criminal liability that did not have adequate evidentiary 
support, refusal to do so did not provide an independent basis for reversing an 
otherwise valid conviction. See also Enyeart, 123 Idaho at 455-456, 849 P.2d at 
128-129 (applying Griffin); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 563-564, 21 P.3d 498, 
500-501 (Ct. App. 2001). At the conclusion of her trial, Griffin, like Wilske, moved 
2 This Court may affirm the district court's denial of the motion on any correct 
alternative theory. State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 694, 991 P.2d 878, 882 (Ct. 
App. 1999). 
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to modify the jury instructions on the basis that the evidence allegedly did not 
support one or more of the state's alternative theories of guilt. Griffin, 502 U.S. at 
47-48. Griffin, like Wilske, was not entitled to such a modification. 
Because the district court was not required to modify the jury instructions 
to remove those alternative charging theories that were not supported by the 
evidence (even assuming, arguendo, that the evidence did not adequately 
support these alternative theories), Wilske cannot show he is entitled to a 
reversal of his conviction. 
D. In The Alternative, The State Presented Sufficient Evidence To Support 
Wilske's Conviction For Driving Under The Influence On Any Of The 
Theories Set Forth In Its Charging Information 
In the alternative, even if the district court was required to modify the jury 
instructions to remove any charged alternative theories that were not supported 
by substantial evidence, Wilske has still failed to show the district court erred 
because, as the court correctly concluded, the state presented sufficient 
evidence to support the DUI conviction on each of the challenged theories set 
forth by the state. Specifically, the state presented sufficient evidence from which 
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a rational jury could find that Wilske drove his vehicle while he both: (a) had a 
BAC of over 0.08; and (b) was under the influence of alcohol.3 
First, there was substantial evidence that Wilske actually drove his vehicle 
to the spot where he had contact with Deputy Jacobson. Wilske himself testified 
that he pulled his vehicle over to send text messages. (Trial Tr., p.389, L.25 -
p.390, L.7.) The rural nature of the road, in a place where Deputy Jacobson did 
not usually see vehicles parked, provided further circumstantial evidence that 
Wilske arrived at that location by driving his own vehicle. (See Trial Tr., p.163, 
Ls.10-17.) The State was not required to present testimony of an eyewitness to 
Wilske's act of driving under the influence in order to sustain his conviction. See 
State v. Roth, 138 Idaho 820, 824-25, 69 P.3d 1081, 1085-86 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Next, the state presented substantial evidence that Wilske's BAC was .08 
or over (and in fact, .125/.132), by the time Deputy Jacobson obtained a breath 
sample following Wilske's arrest. (Trial Tr., p.178, L.24 - p.188, L.8.) While 
Wilske challenged the admission of this BAC evidence prior to trial (R., pp.289-
3 On appeal, Wilske also asserts that the state failed to present sufficient 
evidence from which a rational jury could find that Wilske was in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while he was under the influence of alcohol. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.14, 17.) However, as noted above, this was actually the only alternative 
charging theory that Wilske did not challenge in his motion at the conclusion of 
the trial: 
Court: So your contention is that - if your motion is granted 
the only issue left for the jury is whether the state could 
prove that while being in actual physical control of that motor 
vehicle he was under the influence of alcohol. 
[Wilske's counsel]: That's accurate. 
(Trial Tr., p.407, Ls.14-19.) In any event, for the reasons set forth in Section 11-E, 
infra, the state asserts that the state presented substantial evidence supporting 
this theory as well. 
17 
291), this challenge was unsuccessful (R., p.317), and Wilske has not challenged 
the court's determination admitting this evidence on appeal. The jury was 
entitled to consider the evidence presented to it, and for the purposes of an 
appellate sufficiency of the evidence analysis, the Court reviews the evidence 
that was actually presented without regard to its admissibility. Moore, 148 Idaho 
at 894, 231 P.3d at 539. Additionally, the state presented expert testimony to 
assist the jury in analyzing the relationship between an individual's consumption 
of alcohol, the passage of time, and measured blood-alcohol content. (Trial Tr., 
p.356, L.11 - p.358, L.23; p.372, L.20 - p.378, L.9.) 
Further, the state presented substantial evidence that Wilske was under 
the influence of alcohol when Deputy Jacobson came into contact with him. 
Deputy Jacobson observed that Wilske had slurred speech, glassy and 
bloodshot eyes, smelled like alcohol, and was sluggish in responding to a 
command. (Trial Tr., p.167, Ls.11-21; p.168, Ls.8-23.) Wilske then failed the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus and walk-and-turn tests, and failed to complete the 
one-leg-stand test. (Trial Tr., p.174, L.15- p.177, L.11.) 
Finally, there was also substantial evidence that Wilske's actual driving of 
his vehicle was not so remote in time from Officer Jacobson's observations and 
Wilske's submission to the breathalyzer test as to render a jury's conclusion of 
guilt regarding these alternative theories as "irrational." Deputy Jacobson 
observed that Wilske was texting on his phone with his car engine running - facts 
from which a rational jury could infer that Wilske had not been parked on the road 
for an extended period of time. (Trial Tr., p.164, L.18 - p.165, L.10.) Wilske 
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himself testified that he had been parked on the road for only thirty to forty-five 
minutes before Deputy Jacobson arrived. (Trial Tr., p.390, Ls.19-24.) A rational 
juror could reasonably infer that, based upon the evidence of Wilske's alcohol 
intoxication and heightened BAC, and the relatively short amount of time he was 
parked on the side of the road, that he was already under the influence of 
alcohol, and already had a BAC of .08 or above, by the time he pulled over. 
On appeal, Wilske relies, in part, on his trial testimony that he only 
consumed one can of beer prior to pulling his car over, and that he drank multiple 
additional cans of beer only after he stopped driving. (Appellant's brief, p.17.) 
Therefore, Wilske implicitly argues, there was no evidence that he was under the 
influence of alcohol or had a BAC higher than .08 when he was still actually 
driving. However, the jury was not required to believe Wilske's testimony. For 
the reasons discussed above, the jury could instead reject Wilske's testimony 
and reasonably find that Wilske was already under the influence, and already 
had a BAC of 0.08 or above, when he pulled over to the side of the road. 
Because the state presented substantial evidence from which a rational 
jury could conclude that Wilske was guilty of driving under the influence on any of 
the alternative theories it set forth, Wilske cannot show that the court erred in 
denying his motion for a "partial directed verdict," even assuming, arguendo, that 
the court was required to modify the instructions to remove alternative charging 
theories not supported by the evidence. This Court should therefore affirm his 
conviction. 
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E. Even If The Court Erred, Any Such Error Is Harmless 
An error is harmless if the appellate court is able to say, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result absent the 
error." State v. Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 578, 114 P.3d 133, 136 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(citing State v. Boman, 123 Idaho 947, 950-51, 854 P.2d 290, 293-94 (Ct. App. 
1993)). 
In this case, even If the district court was required to modify the jury 
instructions to remove alternative charging theories not supported by the 
evidence, and even if any of the alternative charging theories set forth by the 
state were not supported by sufficient evidence, any error in the district court's 
denial of Wilske's motion for a "partial directed verdict" was harmless. The state 
presented overwhelming evidence to support the one alternative charging theory 
that Wilske did not move to strike from the charging information and the jury 
instruction - that Wilske was in actual physical control of his vehicle while he was 
under the influence of alcohol. As discussed above, the state presented 
substantial evidence that Wilske was under the influence of alcohol by the time 
Officer Jacobson arrived at Wilske's vehicle. Additionally, Wilske's trial testimony, 
if the jury chose to believe it, only supported this theory. Wilske testified that he 
drank one beer at a friend's house, three in the vehicle after he pulled over but 
while the car engine was still running, and only a portion of a fifth beer after 
Deputy Jacobson had arrived and Wilske turned off the car engine. (Trial Tr., 
p.391, L.22 - p.392, L.14; p.395, L.13 - p.396, L.20.) In light of this evidence, 
there is no reasonable probability that the jury rejected the state's theory that 
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Wilske was in actual physical control of his vehicle while under the influence, but 
convicted him on some other theory that was improperly before it. 
The district court was not required to modify the jury instructions to 
remove alternative charging theories that were not supported by the evidence. In 
any event, the state presented sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could 
conclude that he was guilty of driving under the influence under any of the 
theories set forth by the state in its charging information. Even if the court erred, 
any such error was harmless. This Court should therefore affirm the conviction. 
111. 
Wilske Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Concluding That He 
Violated His Probation 
A Introduction 
Wilske contends that the district court erred in concluding that he violated 
his probation in his 2010 DUI case. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-19.) Wilske's claim 
fails because a review of the record reveals that substantial evidence, including 
Wilske's admissions, supports the district court's determination. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[A] district court's finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal 
if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding." State v. 
Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (citing State v. Lafferty, 
125 Idaho 378,381,870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
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C. The District Court's Finding That Wilske Violated His Probation Was 
Based Upon Substantial Evidence In The Record 
The state alleged that Wilske violated his probation in the 2010 DUI case 
by: (1) committing the offense of driving under the influence; (2) committing the 
offense of misdemeanor possession of marijuana; (3) committing the offense of 
possession of drug paraphernalia; (4) consuming alcohol; (5) possessing alcohol; 
(6) possessing marijuana; and (7) possessing drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.319-
320). After an evidentiary hearing at which the district court took judicial notice of 
Deputy Jacobson's testimony and the jury verdicts from Wilske's 2013 DUI trial 
(1/6/14 Tr., p.5, L.22 - p.7, L.5), the court concluded that Wilske violated his 
probation in each of the manners alleged by the state (1/6/14 Tr., p.9, L.15 -
p.10, L.17). This determination is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Wilske admitted on the record, through 
counsel, that he violated his probation by consuming and possessing alcohol. 
(1/6/14 Tr., p.5, Ls.6-7.) As Wilske acknowledges on appeal (Appellant's brief, 
p.19), a probationer's admission constitutes substantial evidence to support a 
district court's finding of a probation violation. See State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 
308, 312, 1 P.3d 809, 813 (Ct. App. 2000). Further, Deputy Jacobson's trial 
testimony and the jury verdicts clearly establish that Wilske also violated his 
probation by driving under the influence, possessing marijuana, possessing drug 
paraphernalia, and committing the crimes associated with those acts. (See Trial 
Tr., p.163, L.6 - p.325, L.3; R., p.334.) 
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Because substantial evidence supports the district court's determination, 
this Court should affirm the district court's order finding that Wilske violated his 
probation in the 2010 DUI case. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Wilske's conviction for 
driving under the influence in the 2013 case and the district court's order finding 
that Wilske violated his probation in the 2010 case. 
DATED this 26th day of January 2015 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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